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Come Join Us" 
Volunteer Organizing 
From a Local-Union Base 
• Steve Babson 
Two groups clustered in the meeting hall. Their contrasting 
uniforms gave the appearance of two army units warily eyeing 
each other: one group dressed in short-sleeve blue shirts, the other 
in long-sleeve khaki. But these were not rival armies; these people 
were gathering for a union organizing meeting. 
The blue uniform shirts identified plant workers from Delta 
U.S.A., a Japanese owned manufacturer of automobile seats 
located in Monroe, Michigan, thirty miles south of Detroit. Some 
65 of them had come to their first meeting to ask questions about 
the UAW. The 20 workers in khaki had come to answer them. They 
were UAW activists from the nearby Mazda assembly plant where 
Delta shipped its seats. 
"I know what you face, because that's what we faced," said one 
of several Local 3000 speakers who described their work experi-
ence at Mazda. His litany brought nods of recognition from the 
Delta workers: favoritism, speed up, carpal tunnel syndrome, 
arbitrary work-rule changes. "We still face these things," he added, 
"but I know we can do something about it now because we're 
together, we're a union." 
Only a few hours earlier, company supervisors had warned 
• Steve Babson is a staff member at the labor Studies Center of Wayne State University 
in Detroit, Michigan. 
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Delta workers to expect dues-hungry "professionals" from the 
UAW. Instead, they met workers who were the same age, lived 
in the same industrial suburbs, and had the same workplace prob-
lems. They met volunteers who would, in the ensuing weeks, 
leaflet their plant on winter mornings, come to organizing 
meetings after shift, and make evening house calls. 
Four months later, May 3, 1991, Delta workers elected to join 
the UAW by a vote of 68 to 58. The small numbers belie the real 
significance of this achievement, for Delta is the largest Japanese-
owned supplier yet organized by the UAW. Equally important, this 
victory highlights the potency of two overlapping strategies: the 
use of volunteer organizers, and the reliance on a local-union base 
for launching and sustaining a drive. 
FIRST CONTACT 
A previous effort to organize Delta failed in 1988, for all the 
familiar reasons. Delta-Kogyo of Hiroshima had just started opera-
tions in Michigan to supply Mazda, its principal customer in both 
Japan and the United States. The company located its new plant 
in the city of Monroe and drew two-thirds of its new hires from 
the town, many of them laid-off autoworkers grateful for a job. 
A few former UAW members began passing out cards, but there 
was no organizing committee and only intermittent contact with 
a full-time organizer. Delta management called a series of captive 
audience meetings, announced a Christmas bonus of $200, and 
asked for another chance to address employee concerns. The drive 
collapsed. 
In the meantime, however, the UAW's fledgling Mazda local, 
itself only a year old, was making its first efforts to organize among 
the 40 Michigan-based firms that supply Mazda. Most of these 
companies are nonunion and many are Japanese transplants. Local 
3000's leaders recognized that efforts to raise wages and working 
conditions at their plant, if not matched by similar improvements 
at these suppliers, would ultimately induce more outsourcing of 
work. 
To kick off its organizing drive, the local targeted two companies 
that were small and close at hand: MANA, a Mazda-owned packag-
ing and shipping subsidiary located next to the main plant in Flat 
Rock, and Pentsone, a Japanese-owned supplier of window 
assemblies located in the neighboring town of Rockwood. 
When both were organized in 1988 they added only 50 members 
to the union's roster, but these victories established Local 3000 
as an amalgamated union with an ambitious organizing agenda. 
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Unfortunately, deteriorating relations with Mazda management 
and hotly contested, back-to-back elections for union leadership 
absorbed Local 3000's energies in 1989-1990. New initiatives in 
organizing suffered. 
By the fall of 1990, the local was ready to take another crack 
at organizing. Delta was the obvious target, both because of its 
location in neighboring Monroe and because a nucleus of union 
supporters was already in touch with Local 3000's leaders. They 
didn't have any trouble finding them. "Jim Emerick, one of the 
Delta leaders, is my brother-in-law," explains Greg Drudi, the 
Bargaining Chair at Mazda. "We talked all the time, and other 
people from Mazda knew Delta workers as neighbors, friends, and 
family. When it came time to get things moving, we started with 
a couple of small meetings in the basement of my house." 
"HAVE NO FEAR" 
When the Delta organizing drive went public in January 1991, 
Local 3000 took the lead. Delta's union supporters reported that 
a sizable number of their co-workers were "red hot" for the UAW, 
but many were also convinced that if they went public, manage-
ment would retaliate. Traditional practice might have called for 
a full-time union organizer to step into the breach and make the 
initial public contacts. Instead, Mazda workers stepped in. 
"We had 30-40 people down there leafleting in the snow or rain 
at 6 in the morning," recalls Local 3000 President Phil Keeling. 
"The commitment from all levels of local leadership was fan-
tastic' ' The first leaflet prominently featured the role of the Mazda 
local. "HAVE NO FEAR," it trumpeted in bold-face letters, 
"DELTA CANNOT RETALIATE AGAINST YOU. If they even try, 
they will have to answer to the National Labor Relations Board, 
and more importantly, to us at Mazda, their most important 
customer. WE ARE THREE THOUSAND MEMBERS STRONG! 
. . .COME JOIN US." 
In short order, about two-thirds of the Delta workforce did just 
that, attending a series of open meetings and signing authorization 
cards for an NLRB election. Delta management countered with 
a textbook campaign of intimidation and cooptation: hiring secur-
ity guards to "protect" Delta workers from the UAW; retaining 
a consulting firm, Sterner, Wilson, Clifton, and Wolf, to train 
supervisors in one-on-one communications; holding captive audi-
ence meetings featuring films of union violence; producing a 
special slide show on the "Delta Family"; and encouraging a "Vote 
No" committee of Delta workers. In addition, the company intro-
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duced a more lenient attendance policy and a "Peer Review 
Board" to counter union demands for a grievance procedure and 
generally blanketed the workplace with a blizzard of memos on 
the UAW Constitution, the salaries of UAW officials, and the good 
intentions of Delta management. 
That Delta's UAW supporters retained their majority and won 
the election is a testimony to the hard work of their 22-member 
in-plant committee, assisted by the full-time UAW organizer 
assigned to the drive, Frank White. House calls, rallies, and a 
weekly newsletter, "You/nion News," sustained the UAW presence 
and countered management claims that the union was a third-
party outsider. "We had a big committee that could communicate 
one-on-one with every Delta worker," White observed. "They 
could see it was their union." 
Once Delta's in-plant committee got off the ground, the Mazda 
local provided it with crucial support. "Mazda members were very 
active," says White, "willing to do anything you asked them to 
do. They'd pull people out of the plant on lost time, their 
secretaries typed for me, I had free access to their copier, their 
printer, their phones. Without all those resources, I'm not sure 
we could have held things together." Local 3000's Education 
Committee invited Delta's entire in-plant committee to attend 
its Saturday "Union Awareness" classes. The local's first Vice 
President, Mary Olson-Carter, also remained active throughout, 
helping White organize meetings and produce the newsletter 
during the hectic closing weeks of the campaign. 
Above all, the visible presence of Mazda's UAW members helped 
sustain the drive. "Delta's people could see these union members 
were workers like themselves," says White, "and they could relate 
to them more than to a full-time union official." 
CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS 
A growing number of unions are echoing White's positive 
appraisal of volunteer organizers. "They know the work, they 
know the drill," says Linda Cromer, Director of Organizing for 
RWDSU. "Nobody understands the frustrations of the job like 
someone who's been there." RWDSU uses volunteers from union-
ized poultry plants in a major campaign to organize nonunion 
poultry workers. (See LRR 16.) ACTWU uses volunteers to help 
organize clothing and textile mills in the South; SEIU uses them 
to organize healthcare workers; and the UFCW also relies exten-
sively on volunteers. 
Volunteers gain as much as they give in these campaigns. In 
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Volunteers from Delta's in-plant organizing committee discuss strategy with 
UAW Local 3000 President Phil Keeling. 
addition to the satisfaction of helping others help themselves, they 
develop a wider sense of labor as a social movement and a deeper 
commitment to their own union. Still, there are compelling reasons 
why many union members do not volunteer their time. 
They have little enough time to give, for one thing. Recent trends 
(single-parent families, both parents working, multiple job holding) 
make it hard to juggle the demands of work and family, much less 
union organizing. Many members also lack confidence in their 
own ability to motivate others and in their union's ability to make 
a difference. 
Some of these obstacles can be overcome by leadership action. 
The RWDSU, for example, allocated $ 1 million at its last conven-
tion to finance the cost of lost-time wages for volunteer organizers, 
allowing them to leave their jobs in the North and participate full 
time in the union's southern organizing campaigns. The UAW has 
made a similar commitment by earmarking a portion of the 
interest from its strike fund to cover the lost-time wages of 
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volunteer organizers. 
But in the vast majority of cases where lost-time funds are not 
available, leadership must motivate the unpaid work of volunteers. 
UAW Region 1A Director Bob King has made such efforts a top 
priority in his west Detroit and suburban district by urging local 
activists to enlist in the several organizing drives currently under-
way. An especially ambitious campaign to organize the Dayton-
Hudson Department stores in the Detroit area has drawn hundreds 
of volunteers to public rallies, "UAW Shop Days," and in-store 
demonstrations. (To date the union has won at two of the three 
stores that have gone to elections.) 
Specialized training can give volunteers the needed confidence 
and skills to participate in a drive. "The worst thing you can do 
is send someone out who has not been properly trained," warns 
Ben Perkins, Director of the UAW Organizing Department. "You're 
speaking to an unorganized group, so you can't count on them 
understanding your message the way unionized workers do. It's 
not only that they don't know the lingo of collective bargaining, 
many also aren't yet comfortable with the idea of standing up to 
the boss. You have to learn to walk and talk delicately." 
Over half of the UAW's regions train volunteer organizers in 
these communications techniques, and many other unions have 
initiated similar training efforts. The Steelworkers, Chemical 
Workers, and Hotel and Restaurant Employees, among others, 
supplement their in-house programs by turning to the AFL-CIO's 
Organizing Institute. (See article in this issue.) 
INSIDE OUT 
Training can prepare union activists for organizing, but it can 
only enable volunteers who have already stepped forward. What 
motivates people to volunteer in the first place? 
The answer varies according to the type of local a potential 
activist comes from. If it is a top-down "service-oriented" local 
in which a few officers monopolize leadership and the members 
remain passive "customers," then volunteer organizing outside the 
local may appeal to activists who see no outlet for their energies 
within the organization. But such locals will generate far fewer 
volunteers than ones in which internal organizing has already 
mobilized a wider activist base. "For union workers to volunteer 
their efforts in an (external) organizing drive," as ACTWU Educa-
tion Director Jose LaLuz puts it, they must already have developed 
"the sense that the union belongs to them." (See LRR 17.) There 
has to be a "culture of organizing" that gives activists ownership 
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in their union and a commitment to its growth. 
In Mazda Local 3000, this culture grew out of the union's 
protracted campaign to renegotiate its "team-concept" agreement 
with the Japanese automaker. The Delta organizing drive not only 
developed in the context of that effort, but became a part of it. 
Indeed, the two campaigns started at roughly the same time. 
In the fall of 1990, as initial contacts with Delta workers prepared 
the ground for the organizing drive, Local 3000's leadership also 
began to plan for a "contract campaign" focusing on upcoming 
negotiations with Mazda. The union could not rely on the tradi-
tional approach that put the entire burden on the Bargaining 
Committee, leaving a passive membership to ratify or reject the 
proposed contract. The issues confronting the local were too 
fundamental and the mettle of its membership was too untested 
I 
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for such routine practice. In just three years of operation, Mazda 
had effectively contradicted its own promises of "participative 
management" by giving front-line supervision near-unilateral 
powers: the result had been a sharp intensification of work, an 
injury rate three times higher than the Big 3 average, and a 
widespread perception that the flexibility granted management 
in the initial contract had become a license for favoritism. Local 
leaders wanted to bargain for tougher contract language and 
anticipated the possibility of a strike. Would Mazda's inexperienc-
ed workforce follow their lead? 
ONE-ON-ONE 
The answer depended on the same organizing techniques that 
proved so successful at Delta: a one-on-one campaign of com-
munication and mobilization that gave Mazda's members owner-
ship of their union. 
To implement the campaign, the local turned to its corps of 
elected union ' 'coordinators,'' roughly one for every 40 members, 
who work on the line and act as stewards. After a day-long train-
ing session in contract issues and communications techniques, the 
coordinators began talking 
one-on-one with every 
worker in the plant. The 
bargaining survey that 
kicked off the campaign 
not only generated 2,400 
responses in a plant popula-
tion of 2,900, but also pro-
vided extensive documenta-
tion of speed up, favoritism, 
inadequate training, and 
unilateral action by super-
vision. Flyers distributed 
inside the plant or at the 
gates highlighted the survey 
results and focused atten-
tion on the membership's 
shared grievances. 
In the meantime, coor-
dinators circulated a group 
grievance focused on the 
abuse of temporary workers, 
collecting signatures from 
iNews 
Open Door Policy 
Company Philosophy 
lur Company creed Is: 
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Let's Get Moving! Organizing for the 90s 69 
over 90% of the members. Finally, just two weeks before the start 
of negotiations, the local conducted a strike authorization v o t e -
not in the union hall, but inside the plant, with ballots distributed 
one-on-one to every member. The results surprised even the 
leadership: with an enthusiasm that built during the day as 
workers attached to their uniforms stickers that read "Fighting 
for A Better Contract/' 94% voted "yes" for strike authorization. 
These events did not go unnoticed at Delta, where management 
issued several memorandums highlighting the "ongoing uncer-
tainty" of a strike at Mazda. But matters took an unexpected turn 
for Delta management when the Mazda negotiations produced an 
eleventh-hour agreement that not only raised wages and benefits 
to levels that matched or exceeded Big 3 standards, but also 
replaced management's previous control over selection of Team 
Leaders with a new system of election and recall by Team Mem-
bers. Delta's in-plant organizing committee quickly capitalized on 
this turn of events, distributing a detailed summary of the Mazda 
contract to all Delta workers, accompanied by a leaflet emphasiz-
ing the membership vote 83% that ratified its contents. "These 
many gains were made without the necessity of a strike, slow-
down, or any other scary thing that management says will happen 
when we form our union." 
The Mazda contract had an even more direct bearing on the 
Delta drive. During negotiations, Local 3000's Bargaining Com-
mittee repeatedly raised the issue of Delta management's anti-
union campaign, urging Mazda to publicly disavow such union-
bashing in its supplier firms. Mazda management refused to con-
demn these practices, arguing that it could not intervene in another 
company's internal affairs—a claim that conveniently ignored the 
financial and business ties that link these two firms in Japan. 
Ultimately, the contract did contain a compromise letter in which 
the company promised to tell suppliers "of the positive aspects 
and the advantages of its relationship to the UAW." 
UAW bargainers had little confidence this letter would cause 
Delta managers to mend their ways. Management was not the 
intended audience in any case. The real audience was Delta's 
workers, and the intended message was one of solidarity. 
PROS AND CONS OF LOCAL VOLUNTEERS 
Local 3000's role in the organization of Delta illustrates the 
strengths and weaknesses of volunteer organizing from a local-
union base. 
When the "parent" local widens its corps of activists through 
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internal organizing, it generates an enthusiasm about the union 
and a commitment to its growth that translates into volunteers. 
In the case of Local 3000, a total of 35-40 people participated in 
some aspect of the Delta drive, with a half dozen leaders playing 
an especially prominent role. In an era when the NLRB offers 
scant protection for workers seeking unionization, this organized 
and visible presence bolsters the morale of nonunion workers as 
they launch their campaign. 
The parent local can also help sustain that morale after the elec-
tion, when the difficult task of winning a contract still lies ahead. 
At Delta, this may be a particularly arduous job. The company 
immediately appealed the NLRB election results, charging union 
supporters with "intimidation," and fired one member of the 
in-plant organizing committee on the spurious charge of 
"sabotage." Local 3000 has collected over 1500 signatures on a 
petition that labels Delta's actions "an insult to all of us" and calls 
on Mazda to intervene against this "anti-worker, anti-union, anti-
UAW campaign." Many Local 3000 members have expressed 
concern that if Mazda management ignores the petition and does 
nothing to discourage Delta's union bashing, then the quality of 
Delta's product will be so undermined by harsh conditions and 
deteriorating morale that it will no longer meet the high standards 
Mazda applies to suppliers. 
This kind of sustained support from a parent local is lacking 
when a "regional" organizing strategy draws activists out of many 
locals and concentrates their efforts on targeted organizing drives, 
some of them quite distant from the volunteers' home locals. On 
the other hand, when the targeted workplace is in a nonunion area 
with few nearby locals or is a multi-site employer beyond the reach 
of a single local, regional deployment of volunteers is the only 
alternative to organizing from a local-union base. By extending 
the range and therefore the number of potential organizing drives, 
a regional approach also enhances the training and development 
of volunteers: their training will more often have a real-world 
urgency and focus on the particular drive they're about to join, 
and they will have more opportunities to discover which t a s k s -
making house calls, leafleting, writing, giving testimonials, plan-
ning, researching—they are most comfortable with. 
The wider reach of regional organizing has its downside in the 
narrower range of experiences shared by volunteers and nonunion 
workers. When volunteers are "out of their element," they are less 
effective in addressing the doubts and fears of unorganized workers. 
Training can bridge some of this gap, but only with difficulty when 
occupational or regional sub-cultures separate workers. 
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No such gap divided Delta workers from their union counter-
parts at Mazda. As the drive started, Delta workers not only met 
union members they could relate to, they also grew familiar with 
the internal workings of a vibrant, democratic local. At times, this 
too had its downside—Local 3000's tumultuous internal politics 
distracted many volunteers from their organizing tasks and 
depleted the number who could make house calls. It could also 
be argued that the Mazda local was too close to the Delta drive: 
if a Mazda strike had occurred, it would only have confirmed Delta 
management's dire predictions. Even so, it's probably better that 
Delta workers learned about the sometimes messy process of 
collective action from people they could trust, rather than rely-
ing solely on management and media accounts. 
Ultimately, however, the supportive role of Local 3000 could 
only go so far; beyond that point, the volunteer organizers from 
Mazda had to step back. "We had to reign them in sometimes," 
as one staff organizer observed. "The Mazda people wanted to 
do too much, come to every meeting, hand out every leaflet, and 
confront the cops when they tried to remove us from Delta pro-
perty. We had to let the Delta people build their union. They had 
to own it." 
And that's the name of the game for all union members, 
organized or soon-to-be. • 
Delta worker's solid victory resulted from a strong in-plant committee and 
enthusiastic volunteer member organizers from the workers at Mazda. 
